P.N.A.C 2000
by Bette Stockbauer. June 18,
2003
"The process of Transformation, even if it brings about
Revolutionary Change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastophic and
catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harour"
Rebuilding America's Defenses (RAD)" is a policy document
published by a neoconservative Washington think tank called the Project for the
New American Century (PNAC). Its pages have been compared to Hitler's Mein Kampf
in that they outline an aggressive military plan for U.S. world domination
during the coming century. And just as Hitler's book was not taken seriously
until after his catastrophic rise to power, so it seems that relatively few
Americans are expressing alarm at this published document that is a blueprint
for many of the present actions of the Bush administration, actions which have
begun to destabilize the balance of power between the nations of the world.
There is, indeed, much reason for alarm because PNAC is not an
ordinary think tank and "RAD" is not an ordinary policy paper. Many PNAC members
now hold key positions in the White House, Defense and State Departments, among
them Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Elliot Abrams,
Lewis Libby, and John Bolton, along with others in lesser positions. William
Kristol, writer for the conservative magazine, the Weekly Standard, is chairman
of the group.
Some of these men have been advocating for a strong military
posture since the ending of cold war hostilities with the Soviet Union. Wishing
to capitalize on the fact that the US had emerged as the world's preeminent
superpower, they have lobbied for increases in military spending in order to
establish what they call a Pax Americana that will reap the rewards of complete
military and commercial control of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. This,
they said, would be accomplished by the waging of "multiple simultaneous
large-scale wars" and one of their first orders of business was always the
removal of Saddam Hussein, thereby giving the US a toehold in the oil-rich
Middle East.
During the Clinton presidency, when the Republicans were out of
power, this militaristic wing in American politics became highly organized and
efficient. They formed the PNAC in 1997 And published "RAD" in September 2000.
Determined to have their world empire, they offered an eerie prophecy on page 52
of that document about how it might be accomplished, "Further, the process of
transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long
one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor."
Their dream of a catalyzing event could not have been better actualized than in
the events of 9/11.
Although there could have been many responses to the tragedy of
9/11, the Bush administration seized upon that event to mold public opinion into
accepting many ideas embodied in "RAD". The overthrow of Saddam Hussein, was
being proposed by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz one day after 9/11, even before anyone
knew who was responsible for the attacks. As soon as the war against Afghanistan
was completed, the focus of US policy became regime change in Iraq, with all of
the tragic consequences we are now seeing in that country.
Policies advocated in "RAD" are being enacted with terrifying
speed, such as denigration of the UN, importance of Homeland Security,
abrogation of international agreements, revamping of the US nuclear program and
the spread of American military power into all corners of the globe by
preemptive engagement. In Iraq we have seen the embodiment of "RAD" directives
that call for the subjugation of regimes considered hostile to US interests and
the prevention of military build-up in countries that may challenge US power.
Bush's "Axis of Evil" nations Iraq, Iran and North Korea are mentioned numerous
times as potential trouble spots and there is repeated insistence that the US
establish military outposts in the Middle East and East Asia.
Most frightening is its complete isolation from any ideas of world
unity and cooperative action. The authors appear to be intent on waging war as
an answer to the problems of our planet, tragically imagining that peace can be
won by enforcing American values on every other nation. A more chilling
statement of the PNAC devotion to militaristic domination cannot be found than
in Richard Perle's concept of "total war". "No stages," he said, "This is total
war. We are fighting a variety of enemies. There are lots of them out there. All
this talk about first we are going to do Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq...
this is entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the
world go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we don't try to piece together
clever diplomacy, but just wage a total war... our children will sing great
songs about us years from now."
This article is a summarization of "RAD." I believe it is of
importance to become familiar with this document because it is determining US
policy decisions which will have far reaching repercussions for decades to come.
Subject areas are arranged under three topics: A. Pax Americana, outlining the
rationale for global empire, B. Securing Global Hegemony, pinpointing regions
that are considered trouble spots for US policy, C. Using the Military to Gain
Empire, outlining military plans for complete world domination. My personal
comments are in italics; page numbers are from the original document. See URLs
at the end for further reading.
A. Pax Americana
The building of Pax Americana has become possible, claims "RAD,"
becausethe fall of the Soviet Union gave the United States status as the world's
preeminent superpower. Consequently the US must now work hard, not only to
maintain that position, but to spread its military might into geographic areas
that are ideologically opposed to its influence, waging "multiple simultaneous
large-scale wars" to subdue countries that may stand in the way of US global
preeminence. Rationales offered for going to war with other nations are the
preservation of the "American peace" and the spread of "democracy."
On Preserving American Preeminence
"It is not a choice between preeminence today and preeminence
tomorrow. Global leadership is not something exercised at our leisure, when the
mood strikes us or when our core national security interests are directly
threatened; then it is already too late. Rather, it is a choice whether or not
to maintain American military preeminence, to secure American geopolitical
leadership, and to preserve the American peace" (p. 76).
"The Cold War world was a bipolar world; the 21st century world is
– for the moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with America as the world's
'sole superpower.' America's strategic goal used to be containment of the Soviet
Union; today the task is to preserve an international security environment
conducive to American interests and ideals. The military's job during the Cold
War was to deter Soviet expansionism. Today its task is to secure and expand the
'zones of democratic peace;' to deter the rise of a new great-power competitor;
defend key regions of Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve
American preeminence through the coming transformation of war made possible by
new technologies"
(p. 2).
Four Vital Missions
"RAD" lists four vital missions "demanded by US global
leadership":
"Homeland Defense. . . . the United States . . . must counteract
the effects of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction that may soon allow lesser states to deter US military action by
threatening US allies and the American homeland itself. Of all the new and
current missions for US armed forces, this must have priority.
"Large Wars. Second, the United States must retain sufficient
forces able to rapidly deploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and
also to be able to respond to unanticipated contingencies in regions where it
does not maintain forward-based forces.
"Constabulary Duties. Third, the Pentagon must retain forces to
preserve the current peace in ways that fall short of conducting major theater
campaigns. . . . These duties are today's most frequent missions, requiring
forces configured for combat but capable of long-term, independent constabulary
operations."Transform US Armed Forces. Finally, the Pentagon must begin now to
exploit the so-called 'revolution in military affairs,' sparked by the
introduction of advanced technologies into military systems; this must be
regarded as a separate and critical mission worthy of a share of force structure
and defense budgets" (p. 6).
". . . the failure to provide sufficient forces to execute these
four missions must result in problems for American strategy. And the failure to
prepare for tomorrow's challenges will ensure that the current Pax Americana
comes to an early end"
(p. 13).
On Usurping the Power of the UN
"Further, these constabulary missions are far more complex and
likely to generate violence than traditional 'peacekeeping' missions. For one,
they demand American political leadership rather than that of the United
Nations, as the failure of the UN mission in the Balkans and the relative
success of NATO operations there attests. Nor can the United States assume a
UN-like stance of neutrality. . . . American troops, in particular, must be
regarded as part of an overwhelmingly powerful force" (p. 11).
B. Securing Global Hegemony
"RAD" takes the posture that only the US should manipulate
international relations and points out "trouble spots" that may cause future
problems, like all of East Asia, and Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (now labeled by
George Bush as the "Axis of Evil"). There is concern that several nations might
come together to challenge US interests. Consequently any nation that produces
nuclear weapons or engages in significant arms buildup will be viewed as a
potential threat.
"America's global leadership, and its role as the guarantor of the
current great-power peace, relies upon the safety of the American homeland; the
preservation of a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and
surrounding energy-producing region, and East Asia; and the general stability of
the international system of nation-states relative to terrorists, organized
crime, and other 'non-state actors.'
"A retreat from any one of these requirements would call America's
status as the world's leading power into question. As we have seen, even a small
failure like that in Somalia or a halting and incomplete triumph as in the
Balkans can cast doubt on American credibility. The failure to define a coherent
global security and military strategy during the post–Cold War period has
invited challenges; states seeking to establish regional hegemony continue to
probe for the limits of the American security perimeter" (p. 5).
Axis of Evil
"The current American peace will be short-lived if the United
States becomes vulnerable to rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of
ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We
cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to undermine American
leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland itself.
The blessings of the American peace, purchased at fearful cost and a century of
effort, should not be so trivially squandered" (p. 75).
Iraq and the Persian Gulf
"Although the no-fly-zone air operations over northern and
southern Iraq have continued without pause for almost a decade, they remain an
essential element in US strategy and force posture in the Persian Gulf region.
Ending these operations would hand Saddam Hussein an important victory,
something any American leader would be loath to do"
(p. 11).
"The Air Force presence in the Gulf region is a vital one for US
military strategy, and the United States should consider it a de facto permanent
presence, even as it seeks ways to lessen Saudi, Kuwaiti and regional concerns
about US presence" (p. 35).
East Asia
"Raising US military strength in East Asia is the key to coping
with the rise of China to great power status.
"The prospect is that East Asia will become an increasingly
important region, marked by the rise of Chinese power….A similar rationale
argues in favor of retaining substantial forces in Japan. In recent years, the
stationing of large forces in Okinawa has become increasingly controversial in
Japanese domestic politics, and while efforts to accommodate local sensibilities
are warranted, it is essential to retain the capabilities US forces in Okinawa
represent. If the United States is to remain the guarantor of security in
Northeast Asia, and to hold together a de facto alliance whose other main
pillars are Korea and Japan maintaining forward-based US forces is essential"
(p. 18).
"Reflecting the gradual shift in the focus of American strategic
concerns toward East Asia, a majority of the US fleet, including two thirds of
all carrier battle groups, should be concentrated in the Pacific. A new,
permanent forward base should be established in Southeast Asia" (p. 39).
Europe
"Despite the shifting focus of conflict in Europe, a requirement
to station US forces in northern and central Europe remains. The region is
stable, but a continued American presence helps to assure the major European
powers, especially Germany, that the United States retains its longstanding
security interest in the continent. This is especially important in light of the
nascent European moves toward an independent defense 'identity' and policy; it
is important that NATO not be replaced by the European Union, leaving the United
States without a voice in European security affairs" (p. 16).
Regime Change
"American military preeminence will continue to rest in
significant part on the ability to maintain sufficient land forces to achieve
political goals such as removing a dangerous and hostile regime when necessary"
(p. 61).
"America's adversaries will continue to resist the building of the
American peace; when they see an opportunity as Saddam Hussein did in 1990, they
will employ their most powerful armed forces to win on the battlefield what they
could not win in peaceful competition; and American armed forces will remain the
core of efforts to deter, defeat, or remove from power regional aggressors" (p.
10).
C. Using the Military to Gain Empire
One stated objective of "RAD" is "to outline the large,
'full-spectrum' forces that are necessary to conduct the varied tasks demanded
by a strategy of American preeminence for today and tomorrow" (p. 5). Much of
the document is an elucidation of those missions and includes specific
recommendations about weaponry, deployment patterns, increased personnel and
defense spending. It envisions a future in which the United States is in
complete control of land, sea, air, space and cyberspace of planet Earth and
urges a new rendition of Reagan's "Star Wars" defense shield program.
"Until the process of transformation is treated as an enduring
military mission – worthy of a constant allocation of dollars and forces – it
will remain stillborn" (p. 60).
"If an American peace is to be maintained, and expanded, it must
have a secure foundation on unquestioned US military preeminence" (p. 4).
"In sum, the 1990s have been a 'decade of defense neglect'. This
leaves the next president of the United States with an enormous challenge: he
must increase military spending to preserve American geopolitical leadership, or
he must pull back from the security commitments that are the measure of
America's position as the world's sole superpower and the final guarantee of
security, democratic freedoms and individual political rights" (p. 4).
Army
"American landpower remains the essential link in the chain that
translates US military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence. . . .
Regimes are difficult to change based upon punishment alone. If land forces are
to survive and retain their unique strategic purpose in a world where it is
increasingly easy to deliver firepower precisely at long ranges, they must
change as well, becoming more stealthy, mobile, deployable and able to operate
in a dispersed fashion. The US Army, and American land forces more generally,
must increasingly complement the strike capabilities of the other services.
Conversely, an American military force that lacks the ability to employ
groundforces that can survive and maneuver rapidly on future battlefields will
deprive US political leaders of a decisive tool of diplomacy" (p. 30).
Air Force
"Because of its inherent mobility and flexibility, the Air Force
will be the first US military force to arrive in a theater during times of
crisis; as such, the Air Force must retain its ability to deploy and sustain
sufficient numbers of aircraft to deter wars and shape any conflict in its
earliest stages. Indeed, it is the Air Force, along with the Army, that remains
the core of America's ability to apply decisive military power when it pleases.
To dissipate this ability to deliver a rapid hammer blow is to lose the key
component of American military preeminence" (p. 37).
Navy/Marine Corps
"The end of the Cold War leaves the US Navy in a position of
unchallenged supremacy on the high seas, a dominance surpassing that even of the
British Navy in the 19th and early parts of the 20th century. With the remains
of the Soviet fleet now largely rusting in port, the open oceans are America's,
and the lines of communication open from the coasts of the United States to
Europe, the Persian Gulf and East Asia. Yet this very success calls the need for
the current force structure into question. Further, the advance of
precision-strike technology may mean that naval surface combatants, and
especially the large-deck aircraft carriers that are the Navy's capital ships,
may not survive in the high-technology wars of the coming decades. Finally, the
nature and pattern of Navy presence missions may be out of synch with emerging
strategic realities. In sum, though it stands without peer today, the Navy faces
major challenges to its traditional and, in the past, highly successful methods
of operation" (p. 39).
Overseas Bases to Advance American Geopolitical
Interests
"There should be a strong strategic synergy between US forces
overseas and in a reinforcing posture: units operating abroad are an indication
of American geopolitical interests and leadership, provide significant military
power to shape events and, in wartime, create the conditions for victory when
reinforced. Conversely, maintaining the ability to deliver an unquestioned
'knockout punch' through the rapid introduction of stateside units will increase
the shaping power of forces operating overseas and the vitality of our
alliances. In sum, we see an enduring need for large-scale American forces"
(p. 74).
"As a supplement to forces stationed abroad under long-term basing
arrangements, the United States should seek to establish a network of
'deployment bases' or 'forward operating bases' to increase the reach of current
and future forces. Not only will such an approach improve the ability to project
force to outlying regions, it will help circumvent the political, practical and
financial constraints on expanding the network of American bases overseas" (p.
19).
Nuclear Expansion
"…of all the elements of US military force posture, perhaps none
is more in need of reevaluation than America's nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons
remain a critical component of American military power but it is unclear whether
the current US nuclear arsenal is well-suited to the emerging post–Cold War
world. . . . there may be a need to develop a new family of nuclear weapons
designed to address new sets of military requirements, such as would be required
in targeting the very deep underground, hardened bunkers that are being built by
many of our potential adversaries" (p. 8). If the United States is to have a
nuclear deterrent that is both effective and safe, it will need to test." (pp.
7–8).
"But what should finally drive the size and character of our
nuclear forces is not numerical parity with Russian capabilities but maintaining
American strategic superiority – and, with that superiority, a capability to
deter possible hostile coalitions of nuclear powers. US nuclear superiority is
nothing to be ashamed of; rather, it will be an essential element in preserving
American leadership in a more complex and chaotic world" (p. 8).
Space Command – Control of the "International Commons"
". . . control of space – defined by Space Command as 'the ability
to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an
ability to deny others the use of space' – must be an essential element of our
military strategy" (p. 55).
"The ability to have access to, operate in, and dominate the
aerospace environment has become the key to military success in modern,
high-technology warfare. . . . How well the Air Force rises to the many
challenges it faces – even should it receive increased budgets – will go far
toward determining whether US military forces retain the combat edge they now
enjoy" (pp. 38–39).
"Much as control of the high seas – and the protection of
international commerce – defined global powers in the past, so will control of
the new 'international commons' be a key to world power in the future. An
America incapable of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or
the 'infosphere' will find it difficult to exert global political leadership"
(p. 51).
"As Space Command also recognizes, the United States must also
have the capability to deny America's adversaries the use of commercial space
platforms for military purposes in times of crises and conflicts. Indeed, space
is likely to become the new 'international commons', where commercial and
security interests are intertwined and related. (Pp. 54–55).
Star Wars"Building an effective, robust, layered, global system of
missile defenses is a prerequisite for maintaining American preeminence" (p.
54).
". . . effective ballistic missile defenses will be the central
element in the exercise of American power and the projection of US military
forces abroad. Without it, weak states operating small arsenals of crude
ballistic missiles, armed with basic nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass
destruction, will be in a strong position to deter the United States from using
conventional force, no matter the technological or other advantages we may
enjoy. Even if such enemies are merely able to threaten American allies rather
than the United States homeland itself, America's ability to project power will
be deeply compromised" (p. 12).
Cyberspace or 'Net War'
"If outer space represents an emerging medium of warfare, then
'cyberspace', and in particular the Internet hold similar promise and threat.
And as with space, access to and use of cyberspace and the Internet are emerging
elements in global commerce, politics and power. Any nation wishing to assert
itself globally must take account of this other new 'global commons'.
"Although many concepts of 'cyber-war' have elements of science
fiction about them, and the role of the Defense Department in establishing
'control', or even what 'security' on the Internet means, requires a
consideration of a host of legal, moral and political issues, there nonetheless
will remain an imperative to be able to deny America and its allies' enemies the
ability to disrupt or paralyze either the military's or the commercial sector's
computer networks. Conversely, an offensive capability could offer America's
military and political leaders an invaluable tool in disabling an adversary in a
decisive manner.
"Taken together, the prospects for space war or 'cyberspace war'
represent the truly revolutionary potential inherent in the notion of military
transformation. These future forms of warfare are technologically immature, to
be sure. But, it is also clear that for the US armed forces to remain preeminent
and avoid an Achilles Heel in the exercise of its power they must be sure that
these potential future forms of warfare favor America just as today's air, land
and sea warfare reflect United States military dominance" (p. 57).
Future Forms of Warfare, Including Biological
"Future soldiers may operate in encapsulated, climate-controlled,
powered fighting suits, laced with sensors, and boasting chameleon-like 'active'
camouflage. 'Skin-patch' pharmaceuticals help regulate fears, focus
concentration and enhance endurance and strength. A display mounted on a
soldier's helmet permits a comprehensive view of the battlefield – in effect to
look around corners and over hills – and allows the soldier to access the entire
combat information and intelligence system while filtering incoming data to
prevent overload. Individual weapons are more lethal, and a soldier's ability to
call for highly precise and reliable indirect fires – not only from Army systems
but those of other services – allows each individual to have great influence
over huge spaces. Under the 'Land Warrior' program, some Army experts envision a
'squad' of seven soldiers able to dominate an area the size of the Gettysburg
battlefield – where, in 1863, some 165,000 men fought" (p. 62).
"Although it may take several decades for the
process of transformation to unfold, in time, the art of warfare on air, land,
and sea will be vastly different than it is today, and 'combat' likely will take
place in new dimensions: in space, 'cyber-space,' and perhaps the world of
microbes. Air warfare may no longer be fought by pilots manning tactical fighter
aircraft sweeping the skies of opposing fighters, but a regime dominated by
long-range, stealthy unmanned craft. On land, the clash of massive,
combined-arms armored forces may be replaced by the dashes of much lighter,
stealthier and information-intensive forces, augmented by fleets of robots, some
small enough to fit in soldiers' pockets. Control of the sea could be largely
determined not by fleets of surface combatants and aircraft carriers, but from
land and space based systems, forcing navies to maneuver and fight underwater.
Space itself will become a theater of war, as nations gain access to space
capabilities and come to rely on them; further, the distinction between military
and commercial space systems – combatants and noncombatants – will become
blurred. Information systems will become an important focus of attack,
particularly for US enemies seeking to short-circuit sophisticated American
forces. And advanced forms of biological warfare that can target specific
genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a
politically useful tool" (p. 60)
You can visit the Project for the New American Century Website Here & download RAD or Get it from our Documents page
